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non-owner occupied loans it made to the sellers who are 
still record owners of the houses. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OP THE CASE AND THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
This case involves a situation where the plaintiffs-
appellants (Stumphs) purchased two houses by deed in July, 
1979* but decided not to record their deeds because they 
did not want to accelerate an earlier underlying encum-
brance owed to Deseret Federal by the sellers (Church 
brothers). (R. 410). Instead, the Stumphs told Deseret 
Federal in September, 1979 that they were leasing the 
houses under an oral lease. (R. 343). In March, 1980, 
the Church brothers obtained non-owner occupied loans 
on the houses from defendant-respondent Gate City who 
recorded its trust deeds. (R. 423, 388). Two years later, 
in March, 1982, the Stumphs filed this action claiming 
that Gate City was on notice in 1980 of their interest 
in the houses because the Stumphs' tenants were in 
possession, and consequently the Stumphs had priority 
over Gate City. The Stumphs alleged fraud and damage 
claims against the other defendants. (R. 2). 
Upon motion of the Stumphs the lower court ordered 
the question of priority between the Stumphs and Gate 
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City to be tried separately from the remaining contentions 
between the Stumphs and the other defendants. Although 
the lower court used the term "bifurcation" in its order, 
the court in substance severed for trial and decision 
the priority issue because that was the only issue between 
the Stumphs and Gate City and none of the other defendants 
were involved in that question even though there were 
some facts common to all issues. (See R. 228). The lower 
court left for separate trial the remaining claims between 
the Stumphs and defendants other than Gate City. The 
remaining claims have been scheduled for jury trial before 
a different judge. 
Although Mr. Stumph handled the details of the pur-
chase of the houses in July, 1979, he did not appear at 
trial and the parties stipulated that in making its decision 
the lower court could rely on Mr. Stumph?s testimony in 
affidavits and deposition. (R. 422-23)- The lower court 
determined that Gate City had priority because the Stumphs 
had intentionally concealed and misrepresented the true 
nature of their interest to avoid accelerating the prior 
encumbrance to Deseret Federal, and Gate City was not 
required to investigate more than it did in making non-owner 
occupied loans to the record owners. As a result of the 
Stumphsr intentional acts and omissions, the lower court 
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held that they were not entitled to benefit of the equit-
able doctrine of notice through possession by a tenant 
to avoid the recording statute. (R. 299). 
B. STATEMENT OF PACTS. 
At trial the parties stipulated that the affidavits 
and deposition testimony of Mr. Stumph, the deposition of 
realtor, Dick Bastian, and the statements of proffered 
testimony of appraiser Don Gurney and Gate City officer 
Leon Millett could be accepted into evidence. (R. 421-
425). The following facts have been divided into 
numbered paragraphs for easier citation: 
1. Mr. Stumph first met Dick Bastian in 1977 or 
1978 when Dick Bastian called Mr. Stumph and asked him 
if he was interested in selling a building lot the Stumphs 
owned. (Stumph dep. p. 27). 
2. Thereafter, in approximately June, 1979, Mr. 
Stumph traded his lot to Dick Bastian for a house that 
was partially finished. (Stumph dep. p. 28). 
3. Dick Bastian supplied the money to Mr. Stumph 
for finishing the house. (Stumph dep. p. 32). 
4. Also, in approximately June, 1979, Mr. Stumph 
approached Dick Bastian because he wanted to trade some 
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California property he owned and get into some other 
investments and types of property in Utaho (Bastian dep. 
p. 8). 
5. Dick Bastian told Mr. Stumph that he could probably 
trade for two houses owned by the Church brothers, (Stumph 
dep. p. 43), which houses had mortgages on them. (Stumph 
dep. p. 45). 
6. The Stumphs decided to purchase the two houses 
from the Church brothers. In July, 1979 at closing, Dick 
Bastian told Mr. Stumph that Deseret Federal was the lender 
on the underlying obligation on the houses. (Stumph dep. 
p. 47; Bastian dep. pp. 20, 32, 34). 
7. Dick Bastian and Mr. and Mrs. Stumph were the 
only persons present at closing. (Stumph dep. p. 53)• 
The Stumphs did not meet the Church brothers in person 
until September, 1979- (Stumph dep. p. 74). All of the 
paperwork in the transaction including the deeds, trust 
deeds, trust deed notes, and closing statements were prepared 
by Dick Bastian. (R. 359-60; Bastian dep. p. 11; Stumph 
dep. p. 54). 
8. Dick Bastian testified that he told Mr. Stumph 
that the Stumphs should make arrangements to assume the 
Deseret Federal obligation. (Bastian dep. p. 20). 
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9. The Stumphs described the purchase of the Church 
brothersT houses as a "wrap-around" transaction which 
they wanted so as to avoid activating the Deseret Federal 
due-on-sale clause. (R. 353-54; Stumph dep. pp. 75-76). 
10 * Dick Bastian said he had several conversations 
with the Stumphs and told them that the transaction should 
be recorded. (Bastian dep. pp. 15-21). 
11. Although the Stumphs claimed that Dick Bastian 
told them not to record the documents and that they followed 
those instructions, Mr. Stumph admitted that Dick Bastian 
told him in September, 1979 that Dick Bastian would not 
prepare a written lease for Mr. Stumph showing that he 
was only leasing the Church houses because "that would 
be fraud." (Stumph dep. p. 71). 
12. The Stumphs decided not to record the documents 
and so instructed Douglas Church who was an officer of 
defendant Rocky Mountain Title. (See Bastian dep. p. 22; 
R. 410). 
13. Mr. Stumph discussed with Douglas Church in 
September, 1979 to tell Deseret Federal that the Stumphs 
were leasing from the Church brothers. (Stumph dep. p. 
73; R. 411). 
14. Mr. Stumph told Deseret Federal in September, 
1979 that he was leasing the houses from the Church brothers 
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but that "they had refused to sign any written agreement." 
(Stumph dep. p. 71). 
15. In the spring of 1980 Mr. Stumph asked defendant 
Jay Lewis to contact the insurance company in regard to 
damage to one of the garage doors, because Mr. Stumph 
was afraid that if he made the contact, Deseret Federal 
might find out and invoke the due-on-sale clause. (R. 
399-400). 
16. By March, 1980 the Stumphs had rented the houses 
to the Webbs and the Barrows (R. 337-38), although the 
Church brothers were the record owners of the houses. 
(R. 423). 
17. In March, 1980 the Church brothers obtained 
loans on the houses from Gate City but did not tell Gate 
City about the Stumphs. (R. 423). On or about March 
26, 1980 Rocky Mountain issued to Gate City a commitment 
for title insurance showing the record title to be in 
the Church brothers. (R. 390). 
18• At that time Gate City had been given the names 
of the renters, and Gate City then gave those names to 
the appraiser, Don Gurney. (R. 423-24). 
19. Leon Millett, the Gate City officer who supervised 
the loans on the two houses, lived in the neighborhood 
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where the houses were located and knew that they were 
occupied by renters but was not aware of the Stumphs. 
(R. 423). 
20. Gate City received written appraisals of the 
houses from Don Gurney on or about March 27> 1980. Mr. 
Gurney knew the Webbs and knew the Webbs and Barrows were 
renting. He was not aware of their relationship with 
the Stumphs although he lived in the same LDS ward as 
the Webbs. (R. 424). 
21. Mr. Gurney was informed the Church brothers 
owned the houses but when he inspected the houses did 
not ask the renters who owned the houses and would not 
normally inquire about the identity of the owners. (R. 
424). 
22. Gate City followed its normal procedures in 
making non-owner occupied loans of 80$ of the appraised 
value to the Church brothers (R. 423) and received title 
policies from Rocky Mountain showing the Church brothers 
as the record owners. (R. 388). 
23. Gate City recorded its documents in March, 1980 
showing its lien on the two houses. (R. 388). 
24. Six months after Gate City had recorded its 
Trust Deeds the Stumphs recorded a Notice of Interest 
in Real Property in September, 1980 which notice lists 
the i v ins *'• i i < >r r 
rather than as a 
S U M M A B : -.vr' ^ ?orT-r: j 
"h*- Stumphs as Lur:hasers ;'r:.::i ^ .ie Char :r: r . •-
- -. -•-- h-M?ec '•- Jtumphs were a*»<ar-
" ;re ;naerl;ying Deseret Peae. ^  . - ,- : ^  - 1 ~» *-:d 
" " - * * ° o <-••:. *- - - >" *- •- ^  v-f c., ""' "_ r* *rr s n r; " f^™ £» i 1 V i l l r. ;. L e C C T" I 
neir u—.:: . - - -^  *" - branser-nior as •-'-
oral leas*- The ?vjnph:-2 ~-v - -entrd *->>» h^.:- - . i.\ 
Thermal'1.CM" „ Gate nttj, who was i""iforced :v ihe Church 
brothers that the houses were :- . t i-^- identity 
-e renders a^d af^er receiving appraisais -nu ii-. _e 
LLb.;raroo commit .- -r ^ne Cn,""%r r v^ohe M$ 
."i,' - - ?cori owners j :,acf ~cr:-.j.\;ier occur'--: -; -
I 1 - ' " '6?u1 "r '• ourse i' business 
Gate C-' ". r-.orC" : * * :- .-, - • - - - * : - ..e insurance 
polici° -. 
•j.i j ' . fin1? j 11 r in i ; thai" Hie e q u i t a b l e r u l e r e q u i r i n g 
i n q u i r tenant; in pos ses s ion tu deifcruu *-^ ^v-- -* 
0: * vv^" no avoid tlva r e co rd ing s t a t u t e i s n M i v a . - a b l e • 
to m e ::;^:ru;r:s because Micj Cturnnh:.: had i n t e n t i o n a l l y not 
ii" MIMH- under 5 Unifo^n Real E s t a t e Cont rac t 
1
,1 t^ eu sa 1 e , .. .- \ . * * i \^\. ": -^Q ^ , 
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recorded. In addition, in making the non-owner occupied 
loans there was no change in ownership and nothing to 
indicate that the tenants were not renting from the Church 
brothers. Thus, the Stumphs are not entitled to invoke 
the aid of equity and obtain the benefit of the tenant 
in possession notice rule against Gate City. 
ARGUMENT 
1. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OP THIS CASE, 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT 
GATE CITY HAD PRIORITY OVER THE STUMPHS. 
The lower court determined that the Stumphs deliberately 
chose not to record their sale documents in July, 1979 
even though they were advised by Dick Bastian to record 
the documents. (Finding No. 6). The lower court also 
determined that rather than acknowledging the sale, the 
Stumphs asked both Dick Bastian and Doug Church in September, 
1979 to assist them in preparing and alleging that the 
Stumphs had a written lease. (Findings Nos. 9, 10). 
As the lower court concluded, it seems clear that Mr. 
Stumph was the person who decided not to record the deeds. 
Mr. Stumph claims he followed Dick Bastian?s counsel 
in not recording but admits that in September, 1979 Dick 
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Bastisr, • 5though requested ly '••^  Stumpb to do so. 
^ rt'xor. : "' *" re " tumphs " *.  s r,; - • 
" :, Desere*: Federal beca^-~ ^ •:> ^a.z:.zn c^: . ' - - -•-" >d 
•* , *
 Arr:* - * * ^nt ~ *rt.ner an^ ~oid Des-v-ret 
Federal in September, ili'[KI r.iia* i1" v< " not purchasing 
but was Leasing the houses from tne Church brothers dnu 
f n a : • - - ^ f u s - o T O ^ i;rr any /,r:~ten 
agreement. In spring, l^c ..r. S^rr :. -
^ insurance ^.roany " regard -? damage "o 
i garage ;~ ./ on <~>ne r. - - ' t o avcia li^ect 
; ir% *" n *"* * " r ^ ever-t 3es~ "^ e '~ ?*edera 1 f roin 11 ? ooveri n^ 
tne . : «• - no\-ses . V> °i /;r nn :;,e Stumphs 
"inailv «^-c :: ^e-: -:\ :. > i e s ; :, -JL -•,. -,,.-" • :-nt/hs 
i . , ^ o r* ^ - r1 H P* f^  t *- , «i -> n p r t - q *- VN p •  T ~ r 4 "! - ^ 
• * ac» ,race~y oia~ - • ;* said ^^.^irs ^ansaction 
was pursuant to a Uniform Real Estate Contract :•-. -i^r 
. I'JdJ I d ' l i t , ' • • 
The equitable a c c \ ::i- ^  -4- ~"~ .,- *• " ~ ^ s ^ u o t i v e 
and impu~~i ^ ^ - *ere il! fashioned tj ye;tr.: i.. .< _ 
in . .- . i iu be charged against ne 
cf r *- ~f33^i~iai^.y InriDc^n., persons. , -
v. *,*, faces ana assessed ^oss tc :r.e censer. *-.j 
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most reasonably could have discovered or averted the loss 
even though such person was normally otherwise blameless. 
Thus, notwithstanding the recording statutes, equity sometimes 
relieved a person of the consequences of failing to record 
a real estate transaction. In a typical situation, 
application of the rule took away the statutory priority 
of a document later in time but first recorded and gave 
priority to the earlier unrecorded transaction where the 
failure to record the documents of the prior transaction 
occurred unintentionally through ignorance or mere inadvertence, 
and the person involved in the later transaction easily 
could or should have discovered the truth through appropriate 
inquiry. 
The Stumphs argue that the equitable rule of notice 
through a tenant in possession is absolute and the fact 
that they intentionally did not record is irrelevant to 
the application of the rule against Gate City. They also 
argue that priority should have been determined solely 
by charging Gate City with notice of the Stumphsf ownership 
without inquiring into the Stumphs1 knowledge or choice 
not to record their trust deeds. In support of their 
arguments they principally rely on Toland vs. Corey, et 
al., 6 Utah 392> 24 Pac. 190 (1890) which was one of the 
f • •• "* * * - * - 'I: sous:- tte equitable doctrine that 
possession .. - son orn^ tr.ar* tr^ 
record owner nav requir-- ; subsequent Durch^-'.. «r-
branch - - ; 4 ;ie of fie:- "—/^ crt arc :r.vesc:?at;e 
:ne rights art; 3t,:.;£ .,: *-he pers_- .---•* - -
*.ar: ~: ~ woman * - na: - i: : - estate r^.u was 
Jr possession wa. - * * *, * v a^-".ess fr.thc^ gr. 
^e nad ** - •. recurs . a ie*ro : r - -- : 
.:tT. .
 7--3-cir- r^-s --,*. ^;osequent ^ncu.r.orarcers 
"misled *"t:s ^om~ -/ - j. _«r-- . r.f - -^  ters'iaata 
. ' nuwever. ' : Vur1" i/lT.e-; tr.fi- ,ne ^ *_<= £:: .^ id 
e applied acccr; -^ -. :*-"=/ --1 e a ^ uarticu^ar 
oituati:r: wnen :" statec a~ " . * - • _ -. ,-. 
iver;- :as~ in oq-*: t;? 13 determined tr its "wr. 
peculiar fa?ts; tt ;~s twr merits. Precedent and 
authority are only useful to prompt the judicial 
conscience of the chancellor, and aid him in arriving 
at an equitable decision. 
Later -i^ '; 11:» 1, >i , \^ " : :ed cfttr To lane case have 
involved situations where? the persor • ~ • • . , cord 
tr*> orot-p.-t his prior interest haa J r.nccer-1" L:/ fai-ei. o 
do so. As a result .. . • --• e~era11:; ft~;sed 
on the neglect, however also inriccr .;, . , ^  , en I, 
purchase/. and Ui<- sii - -x circumstances *nicn i-- a 
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weighing of equities required the subsequent purchaser 
to make further inquiry. Each of the later cases relied 
on by the Stumphs in their brief, e.g., Neponset Land 
& Live-Stock Co. v. Dixon, et al., 10 Utah 34, 37 Pac. 
573 (1894); Meagher v. Dean, 97 Utah 173, 91 P.2d 454 
(1939); McGarry V. Thompson, et al., 114 Utah 442, 201 
P.2d 288 (1948); and Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 
1983), involved a basically innocent failure to record 
by the person attempting to rely on the equitable inquiry 
notice rule, and this Court did not address circumstances 
where the first transaction was intentionally concealed. 
Even though this Court emphasized the duty placed 
on the subsequent purchaser in the above cases, the 
inquiry notice rule is still a creature of equity and 
the relative merits of each party should be examined under 
the facts of the particular case. The rule is stated 
in 30 C.J.S., Equity §89, p- 976 that "in applying the 
doctrines of equity, the equities on both sides are to 
be considered, and each case must be decided on its own 
particular facts." Thus, in a situation where a person 
has intentionally created a circumstance which caused the 
problem, equity does not afford protection of an equitable 
-15-
r u i e that wan fashioned r,o orotecr, ];he i n n o c e n t . Other 
e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p i e o IH-MA»II^ ru,p I I<\'JI 11- . 
A l t h o u g h no Mr/sh d e c i s i o n wir.n f d c z s c,iun-.~ - j *-.:s 
case has he^n ' m i l , M-: - has •I.-Cxssed *:^e a p p l i c a t i o n 
of e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s in: * :\e v^ A. . * : ••. ~ -s un 
m a n y o c c a, s i o n s . P o r i n s t an c e , e q J 1 -; w i _ 1 r. \ a 11 o w a 
p e r s o n to benefit ]v""iii ? I M i:i;it"1 w r r n # in J a c o b s o n v. 
J a c q b s o n , 557 P.2d 156, lu5rf lUtah L9Vb;, this Court '/.frUvi: 
. • • ii: is inherent in the nature and purpose 
of equity that It will grant relief only when fair-
ness and good conscience so demand. Correlated to 
this is the precept that equity does not reward one 
who has engaged in fraud or deceit in the business 
under consideration, but reserves its rewards for 
those who are themselves acting in fairness and 
good conscience, or as is sometimes said, to those 
who have come into court with c]p»n hanc^. 
Th i 3 C o 11 r t a I, •;. i stated .;: Bat t is tone v > American 
Land and Development Co. , o " r\ - " ;" '::':'- " * - 3 h 19^ 0 ) , 
f.hat: 
• . . A court of equity wixx generally not 
assist one in extricating himself from circumstances 
which he has created. Plaintiff is solely res-
ponsible for putting [defendant] in a position to 
convey the property, . . . 
A , < z , r \ L z ^ ^ i . ;.: „ %r*piicabie t^ ~ri-
case iv. ™::a: e q u l v ; wil •;• *- a i ^ oe: sens w V»^ - T ° P 
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Individual statements of the rule are contained in 30 
C.J.S. Equity §89, N. 16.5, p. 975-76, wherein it is stated 
that: 
No man is entitled to the aid of the court of 
equity when that aid becomes necessary through his 
fault. 
A court of equity will not assist one in ex-
tricating himself from circumstances which he has 
created. 
Equity will not give complainant relief against 
his own vice and folly. 
In addition, it is stated in note 28 on page 977 that: 
One who seeks the aid of equity has no standing 
to question the application of its fundamental rules 
or maxims. 
This Court has also discussed the burden placed upon 
a person seeking the aid of the courts in fashioning an 
equitable remedy. In regard to a question of unreasonable 
delay, this Court, in Ruthrauff v. Silver King Western 
Mine & Mill Co., et al., 95 Utah 279, 80 P.2d 338, 3^7 
(1938), addressed the issue of laches which ordinarily 
applies to mere acquiescence and inaction over an unreasonable 
period of time, and stated that: 
-17-
It is immaterial whether the transaction 
assailed is void or voidable. If the complainant 
has been guilty of laches, a court of equity will 
not look into the transaction at all. It requires 
conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence. 
These wanting, the court will remain passive and 
leave the parties where it finds them. 
Although this Court was speaking of laches, how much more 
stringently should the equitable rule apply to the intentional 
omission and concealment by the Stumphs in this case? 
It is submitted that the Stumphs are not entitled 
to invoke the inquiry notice rule because their own 
intentional actions and omissions created and encouraged 
the situation they are complaining about. 
II. GATE CITY MADE SUFFICIENT INQUIRY IN 
A SITUATION WHERE THERE WAS NO CHANGE OF OWNER-
SHIP AND THE CHURCH BROTHERS WERE THE RECORD 
OWNERS. 
In this case, Gate City followed its normal procedure 
of investigation in making the non-owner occupied loans 
to the Church brothers. Before closing, Gate City was 
informed of the names of the renters occupying the houses 
and that the Church brothers were the record owners. 
Gate City delivered that information to Don Gurney who 
physically inspected and appraised the houses. Gate City 
believed that it was making loans to owners not in possession. 
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Don Gurney, the appraiser, personally inspected the houses 
and knew one of the renters but was not aware of the Stumphs. 
Gate Cityrs loan officer, Leon Millett, lived in the Temple 
Heights area but was not aware of the Stumphs. Mr. Millett 
knew the Church brothers and had no reason to doubt the 
information he received from them. Gate City received 
title commitments and title policies insuring that the' 
Church brothers were the record owners of the houses. 
Because the Stumphs were still attempting to conceal 
their purchase in March, 1980, one can only surmise that 
under the known facts, if Mr. Stumph had been contacted 
by Gate City he would have taken a position consistent 
with his prior representations and said he was only the 
lessee of the houses. Clearly, Mr. Stumph was concerned 
at that time that any public declaration of his ownership 
would be relayed to Deseret Federal. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that any 
inquiry of Mr. Stumph in March, 1980 would not have yielded 
the truth. Under such circumstances the law relieves 
a person of the duty to inquire. In 66 C.J.S. Notice^ 
§ll(b), it is stated at page 646 that: 
Where inquiry would be unavailing. The 
omission of the person to make inquiry cannot be 
-Im-
material where such inquiry would not have led to 
a knowledge of the fact with the notice of which 
it is sought to charge him. If his conduct would 
have been the same whether he had or had not made 
inquiry, his omission cannot be a reason for 
charging him with notice. 
Under the circumstances of this case, where fee title 
was not changing hands and Gate City was not a fee purchaser, 
and the possession by the renters did not imply owners 
other than the Church brothers, there was no apparent 
reason to inquire of the renters about the identity of 
the owners. Certainly the renters would have confirmed 
that they had no claim other than as renters which fact. 
Gate City already knew. There was no reason for Gate 
City to suspect the renters were not renting from the 
Churchs. Certainly there is no indication whatever that 
Gate City did not act in good faith. 
CONCLUSION 
Gate City submits that the lower court in weighing 
the equities properly determined that the Stumphs caused 
their own difficulty and were not entitled to invoke the 
aid of equity to prevail over Gate City who acted fairly 
and reasonably under the facts of this case in making 
the loans. Even if it could be argued that Gate City 
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should have made further inquiry, it is most likely that 
any such inquiry would not have yielded the truth. Under 
the circumstances of this case, Gate City is entitled 
to priority and the decision of the lower court should 
be affirmed. 
DATED this / / day of April, 1985. 
WATKINS & PABER 
By tfJe/4Z> fi&kjL ,jL 
Walter P. Faber/ Jr, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed^**©, copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondent Gate City to Thomas S. Taylor, 55 East 
Center Street, Provo, UT 84063, and Frederick A. Jackman, 
1325 South 800 East, Orem, UT 84057, postage prepaid, 
this / f ^ - day of April, 1985. 
Walter P. Faber, <Jr. 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Memorandum Decision 
2. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
3• Judgment 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FLETCHER L. STUMPH, et al, 
Plaintiffs, Civil No. 60,237 
vs. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
DENNIS G. CHURCH, et al, 
Defendants. 
This matter came on duly for trial on the issues between 
the plaintiffs and the defendant Gate City Mortgage Company 
pursuant to a prior order of bifurcation. The plaintiffs 
appeared and were represented by counsel John L. Valentine, 
Esq. The defendant Gate City appeared and was represented 
by counsel Walter P. Faber, Jr., Esq. and David J. Hodgsen, 
Esq. The Court thereupon heard the evidence adduced by the 
parties in support of their respective positions and having 
considered the memoranda of counsel and upon being advised 
in the premises, the Court now finds and concludes as follows: 
1. The Court adopts the statement of facts, paragraphs 
1 through 22 as set forth in defendants' brief of final 
argument. 
2. Based on such facts the Cottat concludes that the 
position of defendant Gate City is prior and paramount to 
that of the plaintiffs. 
(Mem. Dec.) (2) 
While defendants1 agent may possibly have determined 
that plaintiffs were the actual owners of the property, had 
he specifically asked the tenants of the premises 
who their landlord was, the Court is of the opinion that the 
failure to ask such question under the circumstances was 
neither unreasonable nor imprudent. Defendant knew the 
occupants were tenants, which fact was confirmed by the 
occupants. The loan to be made by Gate City was not an 
"owner-occupied" loan, and the record title confirmed that 
the applicant, Church, was in fact the record owner of the 
property. There was nothing in the appearance of things to 
in any way indicate to defendant that plaintiffs had any 
interest in the property, particularly where Church was the 
one who initially informed Gate City that the property was 
occupied by lessees. Under such circumstances it was not 
unreasonable for Gates to assume that the occupants were 
tenants of Church. 
On the other hand, plaintiffs for purposes of their own 
calculated to keep their purchase of the property a secret 
from Deseret Federal, deliberately chose not to record their 
deed or any notice of purchase so as to preclude the 
activation of the "due-on-saleTT clause in the prior trust 
deed. Plaintiffs1 own deliberate failure to record for 
(Mem. Dec.) (3) 
devious and ulterior reasons, although not specifically directed 
toward the defendant, nevertheless laid the groundwork 
for the apparent state of facts upon which the defendant was 
not imprudent to rely. The Court is of the opinion that the 
cases relied upon by plaintiffs are distinguishable in 
that in each of such cases there were facts which would 
cause a prudent person to make further inquiry. 
Counsel for defendant is directed to prepare and 
serve, pursuant to Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice, 
appropriate Findings, Conclusions and Decree in accordance 
with the foregoing. 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
Dated this /- day of August 1984. 
BY^PHE. COURT 
Christensen, Judge 
cc: Johr, L. Valentine 
Attorney at Law 
Frederick Jackman 
Attorney at Law 
Walter P. Faber 
Attorney at Law 
Be* I.GV - s n: 3 : : 
A'lLLUNf.f J.SH.Clt; fl 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR T H E ^ ^ - T -
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
FLETCHER L. STUMPH and 
PAULETTE STUMPH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS G. CHURCH, DOUGLAS W. 
CHURCH, JAY E. LEWIS, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN TITLE AND ABSTRACT 
COMPANY, individually and a 
corporation, DICK E. BASTIAN, 
GARY CUFF, Broker for Bastian 
Real Estate and Development Co., 
GATE CITY MORTGAGE COMPANY, a 
North Dakota corporation, GATE 
CITY SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
a North Dakota corporation, 
RHONDA C. CHURCH, KAROLEE W. 
CHURCH, PAMELA K. LEWIS, and 
SAFECO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
The above-captioned matter duly came on for non-jury 
trial on July 11, 19 84 before the above-entitled court, the Honorable 
Cullen Y. Christensen, District Judge, presiding, on the issues of 
priority between plaintiffs and defendant Gate City Mortgage Company 
pursuant to a prior order of bifurcation. The plaintiffs appeared 
and were represented by John L. Valentine, Esq. The defendant Gate 
City appeared and was represented by Walter P. Faber, Jr., Esq. and 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
C i v i l No. 6 0 , 2 3 7 
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David J. Hodgson, Esq. The Court heard the evidence, reviewed the 
exhibits, duly considered the arguments and authorities contained 
in the written memoranda of counsel, made and entered a written 
Memorandum Decision, and being fully advised in the premises makes 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about July 19, 1979 Dick Bastian prepared 
certain documents showing the sale of Lots 21 and 44 of Temple 
Heights on which new houses were being constructed from Douglas W. 
Church, Dennis G. Church and Jay E. Lewis, Sellers, to Fletcher L. 
and Paulette J. Stumph, Buyers, and the conveyance of other prop-
erties from the Stumphs as partial payment. The documents included 
warranty deeds, trust deeds, trust deed notes and closing statements. 
2. The houses on the lots were nearly completed and 
construction was being financed by the Church brothers through 
Deseret Federal. 
3* Prior to closing Bastian informed Mr. Stumph that 
there was an underlying obligation to Deseret Federal and that Mr. 
Stumph should make arrangements to assume said obligation. 
4. Only Bastian and the Stumphs were present at closing 
after which Bastian took the documents to Rocky Mountain's office. 
5. The Stumphs characterized the transaction on Lots 21 
and 44 as a "wraparound" so as to leave the obligation to Deseret 
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Federal in place. The Stumphs did not want the due-on-sale clause 
in the Deseret Federal obligation to be triggered. 
6. Bastian said he told the Stumphs to record the 
documents. The Stumphs claim that they followed Bastian's 
instructions. 
7. The Stumphs decided not to record the documents and 
so instructed Douglas Church. 
8. The Stumphs told Douglas Church to say that the 
Stumphs were leasing. The Stumphs only intended to keep the houses 
for about one year and then sell them. 
9. Mr. Stumph told Deseret Federal in September, 1979 
that he was leasing the houses from the Church brothers but that 
"they had refused to sign any written agreement". 
10. Also in September, 1979 Bastian told Mr. Stumph that 
Bastian would not prepare a written lease because "that would be 
fraud". 
11. Jay Lewis testified that in the spring of 1980 Mr. 
Stumph asked Lewis to contact the insurance company in regard to 
damage to one of the garage doors because Mr. Stumph was afraid 
that if he made the contact Deseret Federal might find out and 
invoke the due-on-sale clause. 
12. In March, 19 80 Douglas Church and Dennis Church were 
the record owners of the two houses although the Stumphs had rented 
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the houses to the Webbs and the Barrows. Mr. Webb testified that 
he thought the Stumphs may have owned the house he rented but he 
did not know for sure who was the owner. 
13. In March, 1980 the Church brothers obtained loans 
on the houses from Gate City but did not disclose to Gate City 
the relationship with the Stumphs or Deseret Federal. The Church 
brothers borrowed less than they were owed by the Stumphs. 
14. Gate City received a title commitment dated March 26, 
1980 from Rocky Mountain showing the record titles to be in the 
Church brothers. Gate City duly recorded its documents in March, 
1980. 
15. Gate City knew the identity of the renters and that 
they were renting. 
16. Leon Millett, the Gate City officer who supervised 
the loans to the Church brothers, lived in the Temple Heights area 
and knew the houses were occupied by renters but was not aware of 
the Stumphs. 
17. Gate City followed its normal procedures in making 
non-owner occupied loans of 80% of the appraised value to the Church 
brothers as the record owners of the houses. 
18. The Gate City appraiser, Don Gurney, who made and 
delivered to Gate City written appraisals dated March 27, 1980, 
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knew the Webbs and knew that Webbs and Barrows were renting. He 
also lived in the same LDS ward as the Webbs but was not aware of 
their relationship with the Stumphs. 
19. Mr. Gurney was informed the Church brothers owned 
the houses and did not ask the renters who owned the houses. Mr. 
Gurney said he would not normally ask the renters who their landlord 
was. 
20. Gate City made non-owner occupied loans to the 
Church brothers on March 28, 1980 and received title policies from 
Rocky Mountain showing the Church brothers as the fee owners as 
stated in the earlier commitments. 
21. In September, 1980 six months after Gate City 
recorded its trust deed, Mr. Stumph recorded a Notice of Interest 
in Real Property which notice lists his transaction as a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract rather than as a deed sale. 
22. There is no evidence that the Stumphs wanted or 
attempted to record the documents after September, 1979 when 
they admittedly had several discussions about Deseret Federal and 
the due-on-sale problem. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and this 
case. 
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2. Plaintiffs deliberately determined not to record 
their sale documents in July, 1979 even though they were advised 
by Dick Bastian to record the documents. 
3. Plaintiffs decided not to record because they did 
not want Deseret Federal to activate the "due-on-sale" clause in 
the prior trust deed. 
4. Plaintiffs misrepresented the nature of their trans-
action by telling Deseret Federal in September, 1979 that they were 
only leasing the houses so as to avoid the Deseret Federal 
"due-on-sale" clause and asked both Dick Bastian and Doug Church 
to assist them in preparing and alleging a written lease but both 
declined. 
5. At the time of the Gate City loans to the Church 
brothers in March, 1980, plaintiffs were still asserting they were 
lessees so that Deseret Federal would not find out about the sale 
to them the prior July. 
6. Plaintiffs intentionally did not record any document 
showing their interest until September, 1980 and even then they did 
not disclose the true nature of their transaction. 
7. Plaintiffs1 deliberate failure to record for their 
own devious and ulterior reasons, although not specifically directed 
toward Gate City, nevertheless laid the groundwork for the apparent 
state of facts upon which Gate City was not imprudent to rely. 
296 
-7-
8. While Gate City's agent may possibly have determined 
that plaintiffs were the actual owners of the property, had he 
specifically asked the tenants of the premises who their landlord 
was, the Court is of the opinion that the failure to ask such 
question under the circumstances was neither unreasonable nor 
imprudent, 
9. Gate City knew the occupants were tenants, which 
fact was confirmed by the occupants. The loans to be made by 
Gate City were not "owner-occupied" loans, and the record title 
confirmed that the applicants, the Church brothers, were in fact 
the record owners of the properties. There was nothing in the 
appearance of things to in any way indicate to Gate City that 
plaintiffs had any interest in the properties, particularly where 
the Church brothers were the ones who initially informed Gate 
City that the properties were occupied by lessees. Under such 
circumstances it was not unreasonable for Gate City to assume that 
the occupants were tenants of the Church brothers. 
10. The inquiry notice rule is a product of equity, is 
not absolute, and may not be invoked by plaintiffs who for their 
own purposes created the circumstances by deliberately not recording, 
then concealing the true situation, and now seeking to claim the 
benefits of equity. 
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11. Gate City has priority over plaintiffs in regard to 
Lots 21 and 44 of Temple Heights and is entitled to a judgment to 
that effect. 
DATED this fc> — At\/ day of August, 1984. 
BY THE COURT; 
tullen £/ Christensen, District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Date: 
JOHN L. VALENTINE 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Date: 
f
-s&- r y 
WALTER P. FABER, JR. '' 
Attorney for Defendant Gate City 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE" 
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
FLETCHER L. STUMPH and 
PAULETTE STUMPH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS G. CHURCH, DOUGLAS W. 
CHURCH, JAY E. LEWIS, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN TITLE AND ABSTRACT 
COMPANY, individually and a 
corporation, DICK E. BASTIAN, 
GARY CUFF, Broker for Bastian 
Real Estate and Development Co., 
GATE CITY MORTGAGE COMPANY, a 
North Dakota corporation, GATE 
CITY SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
a North Dakota corporation, 
PHONDA C. CHURCH, KAROLEE W. 
CHURCH, PAMELA K. LEWIS, and 
SAFECO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 60,237 
The above-captioned matter duly came on for non-jury trial 
on July 11, 19 84 before the above-entitled court, the Honorable 
Cullen Y. Christensen, District Judge, presiding, on the issues of 
priority between plaintiffs and defendant Gate City Mortgage Company 
pursuant to a prior order of bifurcation. The plaintiffs appeared 
and were represented by John L. Valentine, Esq. The defendant 
Gate City appeared and was represented by Walter P. Faber, Jr., Esq. 
and David J. Hodgson, Esq. The Court heard the evidence, reviewed 
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the exhibits, duly considered the arguments and authorities contained 
in the written memoranda of counsel for the parties submitted after 
the parties had rested, made and entered a written Memorandum 
Decision, and made and filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and ordered that judgment be entered in accordance therewith 
as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Defendant Gate City's title priority in the following 
described properties is prior and paramount to that of plaintiffs: 
Real property located at 2569 North 1200 East 
Provo, Utah and more particularly described as: 
Lot 44, Plat "A", Temple Heights Estates 
Subdivision, Provo, Utah, a subdivision according 
to the official plat thereof on file in the office 
of the County Recorder of Utah County, State of 
Utah. 
Real property located at 10 80 East 25 70 North, 
Provo, Utah and more particularly described as: 
Lot 21, Plat "A", Temple Heights Estates Sub-
division, Provo, Utah, a subdivision according to 
the official plat thereof on file in the office 
of the County Recorder of Utah County, State of 
Utah. 
2. Defendant Gate City have judgment against plaintiffs 
on plaintiffs1 complaint, no cause of action. 
3. Defendant Gate City is awarded its taxable costs 
against plaintiffs. 
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DATED t h i s J2_ ^ 
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day o f Attgtrst, 1984 . 
BY THE COURT: 
;ULLEN Y//CHRISTENSEN, 
D i s t r i c-t£/Jiid ge 
2dZi<nzC^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Date: 
JOHN L. VALENTINE 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Date: ^f—/^ ~~ ^ / 
WALTER P. FABER, JR. ^ 
Attorney for Defendant Gate City 
